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Abstract 
Despite the growing importance of EU regulatory agencies in European decision-making, academic literature is missing 
a systematic explanation of how regulatory agencies actually contend with their core tasks of providing scientific advice 
to EU institutions. The article contributes to the theoretical explanation of when and under what conditions different 
uses of scientific expertise prevail. In particular, it focuses on theoretical explanations leading to strategic substantiating 
use of expertise followed by an empirical analysis of single case research. Substantiating expertise use refers to those 
practices in which an organisation seeks to promote and justify its predetermined preferences, which are based on cer-
tain values, political or economic interests. Empirical findings are discussed in the light of the theoretical expectations 
derived by streamlining and combining the main arguments of classical organisational and institutional theories and re-
cent academic research. Process-tracing techniques are applied to investigate the process by which an EU regulation 
restricting the use of neonicotinoid pesticides (European Commission, 2013) was developed. The empirical analysis 
combines a variety of data sources including official documents, press releases, scientific outputs, and semi-structured 
interviews with the academic and industry experts involved in the process. The study finds that the interaction between 
high external pressure and high internal capacity leads to the strategic substantiating use of expertise, in which scien-
tific evidence is used to promote the inclinations of actors upon which the agency depends most. 
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1. Introduction 
Political scientists have observed that European Union 
agencies have increasingly novel and far-reaching pow-
ers (Busuioc, Groenleer, & Trondal, 2012). In addition, 
they argue that agencies develop over time and under 
certain circumstances can even gain more functions 
and autonomy (Coen & Thatcher, 2005; Groenleer, 
2009). Coen and Thatcher (2005) note that the role, ac-
tivities and functions of these non-majoritarian regula-
tors tend to expand, especially in less visible ways, that 
is, informal roles. An indicator of the rising significance 
of functional agencies is their central role in dealing 
with issues that emerge onto the EU regulatory agenda 
and are highly complex, ill-defined, moving in an unan-
ticipated direction and requiring high levels of scientific 
expertise (Groenleer, 2009; Thatcher, 2002). However, 
despite academic work focusing on the growing im-
portance of EU agencies in regulatory areas, the litera-
ture is missing a systematic explanation of how EU 
agencies actually function in their day-to-day activities 
once they have formally been created (Groenleer, 
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2009). Tallberg has indicated that “the operation of the 
agencies, including questions of autonomy and influ-
ence have received more limited attention” (2006, p. 
207) if compared to the literature on the creation and 
design of EU agencies (Dehousse, 2008; Kelemen, 
2002; Wonka & Rittberger, 2010). 
Research looking at how agencies actually contend 
with their core task of providing scientific advice to EU 
institutions is particularly scarce. To fill this research 
gap the article focuses on the EU regulatory agencies 
acting as functional problem-solvers contributing to 
the regulatory decision-making process. It contributes 
to theoretical explanations of when and under what 
conditions the different uses of scientific expertise pre-
vail. Although this question is essential to the study of 
epistemic politics, our knowledge on the factors ex-
plaining scientific expertise use is fragmented and lacks 
a systematic theoretical basis (Boswell, 2008; Schrefler, 
2010, 2013). Understanding regulatory science practic-
es—success/failure to rely on sound scientific evidence 
in risk governance—is of particular importance as bod-
ies offering independent expertise play an increasingly 
relevant role in EU politics and beyond (Busuioc et al., 
2012; Coen & Thatcher, 2005; Groenleer, 2009). To this 
end, one EU regulatory agency—the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA)—has been selected as a start-
ing point to investigate in-depth the phenomenon of 
expertise use. The article contributes to the academic 
discussion by deepening our understanding of the 
causal mechanisms leading to different behaviour pat-
terns in expertise use by focusing on one case within 
EFSA: the process by which an EU regulation restricting 
the use of neonicotinoid pesticides (European Commis-
sion, 2013) was developed.  
In April 2012, the European Commission decided 
not to follow recommendations coming from the 
Member States, e.g. France, but to give a mandate to 
one of EU’s regulatory agencies—the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA)—to conduct an independent 
assessment of the neonicotinoid pesticides’1 risks for 
bees. Based on the risk assessment the Commission 
drafted a proposal suggesting that the use of three rel-
atively new and very commonly used pesticides be-
longing to the neonicotinoid family has to be limited. 
As a qualified majority was not reached (15 Member 
States supported the proposal, 4 abstained and 8 voted 
against), the Commission made a final call to approve 
the proposal, reasoning that EFSA’s scientific conclu-
sions (2013a, 2013b, 2013c) clearly identified that ne-
                                                          
1 Neonicotinoids are a new class of insecticides that dominate 
the market place as they are considered to be effective. They 
cause paralysis and death of insects damaging plants. How-
ever, there are major concerns that neonicotinoid pesticides 
have untargeted effects as they may play a role in recent pol-
linator declines. For more information see: http://www. 
beyondpesticides.org/pollinators/chemicals.php 
onicotinoids constitute an acute danger for bees. In 
2013, the Commission adopted the proposal. The 
Commission made an official declaration and stressed 
that it had chosen to rely on the science-based argu-
ments coming from the independent EU agency rather 
than the divided positions of Member States and the 
influence of the pesticide industry. This suggests that 
EFSA’s scientific opinions had a central role and led to a 
major policy change, i.e. restricting the use of the most 
commonly used insecticides.  
A puzzle arises when one looks at regulatory ap-
proaches to neonicotinoids outside the EU. That is, the 
situation regarding the neonicotinoid family of pesti-
cides in the EU and the US as well as Canada is notably 
different: while Europe was banning the neonicotinoids 
for two years, the US and Canada were renewing the 
provisional registration of neonicotinoids for an addi-
tional two years. Yet, many of the same studies EFSA 
has used to fill information gaps on the side-effects of 
these pesticides on bees are applicable in the US. At 
this point, the question is: why different regulatory 
agencies provide different recommendations on the 
basis of the same evidence? 
To approach this puzzle theoretically, this article 
explores the literature on expertise use. The role of 
scientific expertise in regulatory activities has been 
widely discussed within the political science field of 
studies (Boswell, 2008, 2009a; Hertin et al., 2007; Ra-
daelli, 1995, 2009; Rimkutė & Haverland, 2014; Schre-
fler, 2010, 2013; Weiss, 1979). Political scientists are in 
agreement that expertise can have many functions in 
the policy/decision-making process. On the contrary, 
when it comes to explaining when and under what con-
ditions the use of expertise varies, the existing literature 
leaves several gaps which this article aims to fill.  
Firstly, political scientists argue that the task of 
providing scientific outputs, which are based on exper-
tise rather than interests or values, becomes challeng-
ing if uncertainty is high (Boswell, 2008), the heteroge-
neity of external actors’ interests is great (Blom, 
Radulova, & Arnold, 2008), a deep ideological division 
is present (Skogstad, 2003) or increasing political sali-
ency of an issue at stake can be observed (Schrefler, 
2010, 2013). However, a problem occurs when one at-
tempts to grasp which of these explanatory factors 
(uncertainty, interest heterogeneity, ideological divi-
sion, level of conflict, political saliency, etc.) are defin-
ing, what the theoretical foundations of these explana-
tory variables are and how they can be combined into a 
theoretically coherent causal explanation. That is, we 
lack a detailed theoretical understanding of the mech-
anisms that induce different behavioural patterns in 
expertise use. As a result, the article aims to address 
this fragmentation by approaching the separate ex-
planatory factors as a totality of causal mechanisms 
leading to the outcome and by systematically theoris-
ing how the causal process unfolds. In so doing, the ar-
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ticle relies on the literature of sociological institutional-
ism and argues that an increase in conflict, saliency, 
etc. is not a sufficient condition to lead to the specific 
use of expertise. The external environment and de-
mands affect the use of expertise only if they translate 
into the actual formal and informal pressures towards 
the expertise organisation, e.g., agency.  
Secondly, the above-mentioned stream of literature 
extensively focuses on the external environment af-
fecting the behaviour of agencies (Skogstad, 2003) and 
to a significantly smaller extent on the internal envi-
ronment and capacities of agencies (see Boswell, 2008, 
2009b; Schrefler, 2010). That is, the literature aiming to 
explain the use of expertise has a one-sided focus as it 
only addresses the internal environment of expertise 
bodies to a limited degree. On the contrary, the recent 
academic work focusing on EU agencies’ autonomy and 
functions argues that agencies are multifaceted social 
bodies that given the circumstances may apply diverse 
strategies to carry out the tasks they receive from the 
European Commission in order to reach their goals, 
survive, or increase influence (Busuioc et al., 2012; 
Groenleer, 2009). This suggests that both external and 
internal dimensions have an explanatory power in de-
fining when the different behavioural patterns in ex-
pertise use by the agency occur.  
Consequently, the article suggests a theoretical ex-
planation derived by streamlining and combining the 
main arguments of classical organisational and institu-
tional theories and recent academic research. It argues 
that whether the regulatory policy process can yield ef-
ficient and credible problem-solving solutions is con-
tingent upon both (1) the external environment in 
which a certain scientific output production process 
takes place, i.e. the level of formal and informal pres-
sure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and (2) the internal 
agency’s capacity to produce science-based outputs 
(Scott, 1998). By taking this theoretical approach, the 
article contributes to the discussion by systematically 
theorising which external and internal circumstances 
(and how) generate diverse expertise uses. Nonethe-
less, even though the article introduces all possible 
theoretical expectations of how the interaction be-
tween two causal factors, i.e., formal and informal 
pressure and scientific capacity, lead to the hypothet-
ical outcomes—problem-solving, strategic political, 
strategic substantiating and symbolic uses of expertise—
in the empirical part, the study focuses only on one 
causal configuration—high formal and informal pressure 
and high internal capacity—which is a combination of 
conditions expected to lead to the strategic substantiat-
ing use of expertise. In so doing, it lays a theoretical ba-
sis to study the causal mechanisms leading to expertise 
use practise in which scientific knowledge is used to ra-
tionalise the preferences and interests of the most influ-
ential actors in a particular policy arena.  
To test this theoretical expectation, the aforemen-
tioned case of the neonicotinoid pesticides risk as-
sessment for bees has been selected. The features of 
the internal and external environment within which 
EFSA had to develop a scientific conclusion make the 
neonicotinoid case suitable, i.e., a crucial case (see 
Rohlfing, 2012), for testing how the environment of EF-
SA affects its behaviour regarding scientific expertise 
use. Specifically, the case has been selected as it pos-
sesses a high capacity to produce scientific expertise 
because it successfully mobilised internal human re-
sources: the largest EFSA’s unit—the Pesticides Unit—
was in charge of drafting scientific outputs. In addition, 
EFSA had much sound external research evidence at its 
disposal when drafting scientific conclusions: extensive 
sources of expertise, data, knowledge, and understand-
ing of honeybees and the neonicotinoid pesticides.  
Regarding formal and informal external pressure, 
the environmental field in which EFSA had to deliver its 
scientific conclusions consisted of defined opposing 
positions (laboratory research vs. field research) and 
the conflicting configurations of inter-organisational 
structures competing with each other (industry vs. 
beekeeping associations and NGOs). The biggest chem-
ical manufacturers in Europe, Bayer CropScience, Syn-
genta AG, have been actively involved in the process 
and in due course have filed legal actions challenging 
the Commission’s restrictions and accused the Com-
mission of not relying on the entire scientific evidence 
available and, in so doing, they challenged the EU pes-
ticide regulation. Furthermore, independent academic 
experts seem to be divided regarding the issue. Besides 
the divergence between scientific experts, the issue of 
bee health has received much public attention. The 
topic was widely discussed in media at national, inter-
national and European levels. EU citizens could follow 
the decision-making process and read about the posi-
tions of key actors and the state of scientific evidence. 
As a result, civil society became actively involved. The 
activist group Avaaz initiated an online petition to im-
mediately ban the use of neonicotinoid pesticides: 2.6 
million people have signed the petition. Civil society 
expressed its strong feelings and a clear position on 
where it stands on this issue by organising protests 
against “mega-corporations” and funding opinion polls 
showing public sensitivity towards the issue.  
This article is organised as follows: In section two, 
the theoretical approach is introduced, four hypothe-
ses explaining when and under what conditions differ-
ent behavioural patterns in expertise use occur are 
presented. Yet, the theoretical discussion focuses on 
the factors leading to the substantiating use of exper-
tise. In section three, the research design and empirical 
basis are introduced. Then, section four, the article pro-
ceeds with an in-depth analysis of the process in which 
EFSA contributed to the EU decision-making. Finally, sec-
tion five presents the key findings, concluding remarks 
and develops starting points for further research. 
 
Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 114-127 117 
2. Theoretical Framework: The Use of Expertise 
2.1. Types of Expertise Use 
Regulation in such policy areas as medicines, food safe-
ty, disease prevention or environmental protection con-
tains high uncertainty and necessitates technical exper-
tise, scientific knowledge, sound evidence or risk 
analysis (Versluis, van Keulen, & Stephenson, 2011). The 
inclusion of non-majoritarian risk assessors and regula-
tors in the EU regulatory processes offers different poli-
cy-making options; that is, policy outputs based on tech-
nical expertise and scientific knowledge coming from so 
called independent expertise bodies rather than from 
the unevenly distributed preferences of political actors 
(Héritier & Rhodes, 2011). The main idea behind this line 
of argument is the separation of two main elements 
present in the policy-making process: “[…] functional, 
expert policy-making from broad democratic decision-
making processes […]” (Héritier & Rhodes, 2011, p. 163), 
which, in turn, is supposed to ensure credible decisions.  
In the discussion on how expertise is used by non-
majoritarian institutions, a functionalist approach 
brings us to the effective problem-solving dimension by 
treating non-majoritarian regulators as functional 
problem solvers possessing expertise and providing 
policy-makers with the sound information and evi-
dence needed for well-informed decisions (Majone, 
1996). The functionalist approach explains the delega-
tion of certain tasks to independent bodies as the need 
for collective action, the necessity to resolve commit-
ment problems as well as to overcome information 
asymmetries at the EU level (Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 
2002). This approach brings us to the first category, i.e. 
problem-solving use of expertise. 
It seems that the EU’s institutional architecture in 
risk governance is built accordingly. The duties of risk 
assessment and risk management are divided between 
two different bodies, which are also independent of 
each other: EU agencies and the European Commission. 
EU agencies have the task of assessing risk by producing 
independent and transparent scientific outputs and 
providing EU institutions, in particular the Commission, 
with scientific recommendations. This institutional struc-
ture is claimed to assure independent and scientifically-
based risk assessments which later result in risk man-
agement activities assigned to the Commission.  
EFSA, for instance, describes itself as the keystone 
of European risk assessment providing independent 
scientific advice and communication on various risks 
related to food and animal feed. The duties of EFSA as 
specified in its establishing regulation, Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002 (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union, 2002), entails providing scientific and 
technical support for the Community's legislation and 
policies in all fields related to food and animal feed 
safety-related issues. That is, EFSA receives requests 
for scientific opinions: “the request outlines what is be-
ing asked of EFSA: the issue, the terms of reference, 
the timeframe, etc.” (EFSA, n.d.). Provided that EFSA 
agrees to accept a request, they and the Commission 
settle a mandate that specifies the final terms of refer-
ence and an agreed deadline. A request results in 
the provision of a scientific opinion by one of EFSA’s 
Scientific Panels. Besides this, EFSA is entitled to en-
gage in so-called “self-tasking” activities. “Self-tasking” 
occurs when EFSA detects a particular issue that re-
quires further analysis and research. This institutional 
architecture assures a separation of scientific and polit-
ical tasks, which, according to the functional approach, 
creates an environment in which a problem-solving 
logic is likely to prevail.  
However, the view that agencies provide impartial 
information seems to be in conflict if one looks at the 
regulatory bodies not simply as functional problem 
solvers, but also as self-interested players who may 
pursue their policy goals and strive to protect their in-
dependence and the legitimacy of their institution, 
which is commonly embedded in an unsettled organi-
sational environment (Coen & Thatcher, 2005; Groen-
leer, 2009; Majone, 1996). Although agencies clearly 
use information to solve regulatory policy problems, 
they may also use expertise strategically to advance 
their individual or organisational interests, or those of 
the most influential actors.  
In the literature discussing the problems of techno-
cratic legitimacy, so called independent expertise bodies 
are argued to follow policy preferences imposed by po-
litical actors (Shapiro, 1997), which, in turn, results in 
decisions promoting the distribution of values, rather 
than credible, apolitical and value-free decisions. Here, 
expertise is a source of power and legitimacy to non-
majoritarian regulators and they may use it in the ways 
which are advantageous to the agency and its survival, 
rather than to produce efficient problem-solving outputs 
(Boswell, 2008, 2009a; Schrefler, 2013). This means that 
the day-to-day functioning and the actual behaviour of 
agencies do not necessarily coincide with their image, 
i.e. providers of “neutral” information which is commu-
nicated to the wider public (Groenleer, 2009). This ap-
proach brings us to strategic political, strategic substan-
tiating and symbolic expertise use strategies. 
The strategic use of expertise is divided in two sub-
categories in the literature on this topic: (1) political—
the motivation behind this type of expertise use is re-
lated to the goal of increasing political powers, influ-
ence, resources or/and to strengthen prestige, status 
or reputation, and (2) substantiating—the agent seeks 
to support or justify pre-set inclinations (Herbst, 2003; 
Schrefler, 2010). Furthermore, expertise can also be 
used to imitate what the most important ac-
tors/institutions do and require in general. In so doing, 
agencies can demonstrate their competences in what 
they are doing without actually engaging in substantial 
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activities—symbolic use of expertise. In this case, the use 
of expertise is “triggered by the explicit intention to em-
ulate what has been done by the ‘leaders’” (Radaelli, 
2009, p. 1150) and similar institutions in the field.  
2.2. Explaining Differences in the Use of Expertise 
The remainder of this section proceeds in two steps: the 
general theoretical argument and hypotheses are intro-
duced, followed by a specification of the causal mecha-
nisms leading to the substantiating use of expertise.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) aim to explain homo-
geneity of organisational forms, practices, and struc-
tures, i.e. incremental change using institutional iso-
morphism theory. This theory also focuses on the 
political struggle of organisations to gain power and 
survive. They argue that one of the reasons for incre-
mental change is formal and informal pressure coming 
from other organisational bodies upon which an organ-
isation depends. “Coercive isomorphism stems from 
political influence and the problem of legitimacy” (Di-
Maggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Instead of focusing on 
one particular actor, the principal, as is emphasised by 
the P-A model, the sociological institutionalist ap-
proach focuses on the analysis of the organisational 
field. In so doing, the attention is paid to a variety of 
actors and their relative influence.  
This article argues that the level of pressure coming 
from external actors, both political and non-political, 
makes a difference because the legitimate right of EU 
agencies to contribute to EU decision-making plays the 
key role in the debates on EU agencies’ legal powers 
(Chiti, 2013; Hofmann & Morini, 2012) and de facto in-
dependence (Maggetti, 2012). That is, EU agencies are 
supposed to be an engine of expertise-based decisions 
within the EU and to derive their legitimacy by deliver-
ing unbiased and well-informed outputs (Borràs, Kou-
talakis, & Wendler, 2007). However, to survive and 
adapt, organisations reflect the formal and informal 
rules that are institutionalised and considered to be le-
gitimate in a certain environment. For this reason, or-
ganisations are structured “around rituals of conformi-
ty to wider institutions” rather than concerned with 
their technical activities and production of outputs, 
which are technically valid (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 
p. 150). That is, organisational survival and success are 
defined by other factors than productive activities 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1991). Despite the fact that organisa-
tions are supposed to rely on expertise and evidence 
that are available, they have to produce outputs and 
develop behavioural patterns which lead to the in-
creased legitimacy and resources needed to survive 
and gain credibility. To some extent this depends on an 
organisation’s capacity and strategies to imitate and 
adapt to the environment in which they are based 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Even though these theoretical approaches stress 
the importance of external influences on organisations’ 
behavioural strategies, this should not go too far and 
assume that the causal relationship is one-sided (Scott, 
1998). Organisational literature argues that organisa-
tions not only have to be seen as a part of the context 
surrounding them, but also as individual actors in their 
own right with the power to take action and use re-
sources. The behaviour of an organisation is not only 
defined by its level of formal and informal pressure and 
attempts to satisfy key actors by taking a “common in-
terest” on board. The capacity of organisation to pro-
duce expertise and manage internal issues is equally 
relevant (Borràs et al., 2007; Brunsson, 1989; DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Schrefler, 2010; Skogstad, 2003). At 
this point, the operational level of the organisation be-
comes important in defining how epistemic authority is 
exploited.  
The two dimensions are closely related: taken to-
gether they are expected to influence the behaviour of 
organisations. The explanations referring to the diverse 
strategies for using expertise cannot be seen as a 
straightforward relationship between simple inde-
pendent factors, rather they need to be studied in 
terms of combinations of various conditions which are 
necessary for the occurrence of a certain outcome. In 
this article, two interacting conditions—external pres-
sure (high/low) and internal capacity (high/low)—are 
argued to make a difference to the outcome in the ab-
sence of all other conditions related to the outcome 
(Rohlfing, 2012) (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Theoretical expectations. 




Formal and informal external pressure  
Low  High 
Internal capacity to 
produce scientific 
outputs 
High  Problem-solving Strategic substantiating* 
Low Strategic political Symbolic 
Note: *Empirically tested in this article. Strategic substantiating expertise use hypothesis: expertise is used for strategic substantiat-
ing purposes (as opposed to problem-solving, political or symbolic purposes) when the level of pressure coming from the external 
environment is high (as opposed to low) and an organisation has a high scientific capacity (as opposed to low). 
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In the remainder of this article, a brief introduction 
to all theoretical expectations is followed by the speci-
fication of observable implications. However, the main 
theoretical and empirical focus remains on the sub-
stantiating use of expertise.  
Problem-solving: Provided that the organisation has 
a high capacity to produce scientific outputs (i.e. hu-
man resources, sound scientific evidence), the absence 
of interference with an agency’s activities enables the 
agency to direct its activities to the problem-solving 
use of its available scientific expertise. If the problem-
solving use of expertise is employed, one should empir-
ically observe strict adherence to scientific standards: a 
comprehensive description of the data included in the 
scientific outputs; a clear description of the inclu-
sion/exclusion criteria of evidence; acknowledgement, 
identification and description of any uncertainties; and 
independent and balanced scientific conclusions.  
Strategic political: An inability to produce outputs 
based on sound evidence is likely to be concealed in 
order not to lose status, reputation and power. Organi-
sations that use epistemic authority rather than admit 
that a task exceeds their capabilities can maximise 
their legitimacy and increase their resources and sur-
vival chances (Scott, 1998). In this case, one should 
empirically observe the attempts of organisation to 
enhance prestige/reputation and expand powers/ 
influence (Boswell, 2008; Weiss, 1979). The organisa-
tion attempts to establish or maintain its stance in the 
field. Consequently, expertise is used to gain legitimacy 
in respect to other actors/institutions, rather than to 
find a solution to a specific problem (Boswell, 2008). 
Symbolic: Here, the organisation has to respond to 
external pressures. However, as the scientific capacity 
is missing, the organisation follows similar structures 
and responds to expectations or external pressures by 
simply accepting what has been done by relevant ac-
tors in the field (Schrefler, 2010; Radaelli, 2009). In this 
case, one should empirically observe the replication 
and repetition of what has already been concluded by 
other bodies, e.g., other EU agencies/institutions, in-
ternational organisations or influential bodies outside 
the EU, e.g. US authorities.  
Strategic substantiating: The combination of high 
capacity and high external demands results in the sub-
stantiating use of evidence as the organisation is able 
to actively respond to the pressures and demands by 
suggesting convincing outputs in line with the prefer-
ences of the most influential actors (DiMaggio & Pow-
ell, 1983; Skogstad, 2003). That is, “[t]he greater the 
dependence of an organisation on another organisa-
tion, the more similar it will become to that organisa-
tion in structure, climate, and behavioural focus” (Di-
Maggio & Powell, 1983, p. 154). The organisation has 
to be prepared to respond to demand by using evi-
dence in the way required of it. Diverse environmental 
circumstances call for different organisational actions 
and frame a specific context providing organisations 
with both constraints and opportunities (Scott, 1998). 
If the organisation’s internal capacity to deal with ex-
ternal pressure matches with the external demands, 
organisations are likely to adapt and grow in terms of 
power and influence. For instance, organisations that 
receive negative/positive responses or requests to re-
vise outputs may seek to revise their goals and outputs 
so that they meet the external expectations of key ac-
tors, both political (i.e., the Commission) and non-
political (e.g. organised interest groups).  
As the article focuses on uncovering the causal 
mechanisms leading to substantiation use of expertise, 
the following paragraphs introduce the expected caus-
al process. The task of providing scientific outputs 
based on sound expertise becomes challenging if “an 
increase in the extent of interaction among organisa-
tions in the field; the emergence of sharply defined in-
ter-organisational structures of domination and pat-
terns of coalition; an increase in the information load 
which organisation in a field must contend; and the de-
velopment of a mutual awareness among participants 
in a set of organisations that they are involved in a 
common enterprise” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148) 
can be empirically observed. To explain, organisations 
are engaged in interdependent activities, they are de-
pendent on the exchange of information, and have a 
role in linking (competing) coalitions (Scott, 1998). The 
task of delivering scientific advice on a specific issue 
opens room for debate and interaction with external 
actors; that is, organisations have to collect and review 
existing evidence, and consult various experts and in-
formation sources. As EU agencies are dependent on 
information provided by external actors, they are open 
to various sources of evidence in order to be able to 
make well-informed recommendations. In so doing, a 
wider variety of actors becomes directly and indirectly 
involved in the process. This, in turn, might increase 
the intensity of interaction and interdependence 
(Brunsson, 1989; Schrefler, 2010, 2013). The intensity 
of interaction increases with the amount of infor-
mation coming from various sources that point to dif-
ferent decision options (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). An 
increase in the extent of interaction between organisa-
tions in the field and interdependence results in the 
formation of sharply defined inter-organisational struc-
tures and coalitions as the participants in a set of or-
ganisations become mutually aware of each other’s ex-
istence and positions regarding an issue at stake 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). That is, external groups with 
a common interest form coalitions that have sharply de-
fined positions. The attention of the media intensifies as 
a result of competing positions and contradictions com-
ing from different sources of information, which, in turn, 
results in the intensification of saliency of the issue (see 
Schrefler, 2010). Civil society becomes actively involved 
because it is able to observe how the process evolves 
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and what the rival positions of key actors are.  
The key players in the environmental field will try to 
influence those actors who are responsible for drafting 
scientific outputs and have a great influence on the fi-
nal outcomes, e.g. agencies (Skogstad, 2003). External 
actors may use various (formal and informal) instru-
ments to influence the functional organisations. These 
include: constraints by political actors, e.g. stringent 
mandates for a specific task, tight monitoring and su-
pervision, or attempts to capture the agency by exter-
nal organised groups, e.g. by providing expertise (Di-
Maggio & Powell, 1983). The pressure comes in the 
form of force, persuasion, or an invitation to join the 
mainstream position of relevant actors in the environ-
mental field, i.e. the totality of relevant actors (DiMag-
gio & Powell, 1983).  
In order to test the strategic substantiating exper-
tise use hypothesis, one should focus on the inclu-
sion/exclusion criteria of scientific evidence that is con-
sidered by the agency: are the exclusion/inclusion 
criteria clear and transparent; do they follow the estab-
lished practices of evaluating evidence (instead of in-
troducing new practices)? In the case of substantiating 
use of expertise, one should empirically observe clear 
patterns of the one-sided use of scientific evidence 
that supports the interests of key actors in the envi-
ronmental field, i.e. the actor on which organisation’s 
survival and legitimacy depend most. If the agency de-
liberately collects evidence that supports a specific po-
sition and aims to confront opponents, rather than re-
lying on a full range of scientific evidence, this implies a 
substantiating application of expertise (Boswell, 2008; 
Hertin et al., 2007). Evidence that coincides with pre-
ferred positions, which are made based on political or 
economic interests, is employed to take decisions and 
to gain superiority over alternative positions (Hertin et 
al., 2007). According to Boswell (2009b), the substanti-
ating use of knowledge enables the agent to gain sup-
port and approval for the choices they make when tak-
ing important decisions.  
3. Research Design  
This article proceeds with the within-case level analysis 
to understand the theory-based explanations that 
specify the linkage between causal factors and out-
comes (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Rohlfing, 2012). The 
empirical analysis is centred on a single case, as such 
an approach facilitates the theoretical goals of the arti-
cle, i.e. to provide sufficient proof of a causal relation-
ship and to trace whether the causal process unfolded 
as expected. An in-depth analysis of one particular case 
allows explaining the phenomenon as fully as possible, 
which is needed when tracing how causal mechanisms 
unfold. In so doing, the article fills a research gap left 
by political scholars investigating the phenomenon of 
expertise use. However, the single case research 
strategy selected for this research entails some weak-
nesses, i.e. it does not allow generalisation covering a 
wider range of cases (Rohlfing, 2012). Therefore, fur-
ther research is needed to test if the same patterns 
unfold in other EU/national agencies or internation-
al/national/regional independent expertise bodies 
providing scientific advice. 
Cases that meet the theoretical requirements, i.e. 
high capacity and high pressure, are suitable for testing 
the hypothesis (Rohlfing, 2012). The case selection 
strategy applied in this article—typical cases2—allows 
for generalisation regarding other cases which are 
close to the selected case in terms of distribution, i.e. 
meet the same causal conditions. That is to say, the 
empirical conclusions regarding neonicotinoid pesti-
cides can arguably be used as a basis for generalisation 
for cases within EFSA that have been developed under 
the same internal and external conditions: high capaci-
ty and high external pressure. Such cases could be 
GMOs, nutrition, bisphenol A, flavourings, food addi-
tives, etc. However, one must note that the conditions 
under which the agency has to provide expertise can 
vary over time. For instance, EFSA has conducted risk 
assessments on bisphenol A several times, each time 
under different conditional combinations. Therefore, 
only the risk assessment on bisphenol A in relation to 
baby feeding bottles has undergone similar processes 
to the neonicotinoids case. In short, generalisation is 
not issue-specific. On the contrary, generalisation is 
plausible in terms of the combinations of various con-
ditions that are necessary for the occurrence of a cer-
tain outcome. 
To increase the validity of empirical data this study 
relies on data triangulation. Several sources of inde-
pendent evidence are employed: publicly available in-
formation, e.g. scientific outputs, press releases and ten 
semi-structured interviews; direct observations, e.g. 
public speeches at the events attended.3 The interview-
ees were selected based on their activities regarding the 
health of bees and scientific expertise (only scientific ex-
perts were interviewed to keep the discussion at the sci-
entific level). The selected interviewees are the key sci-
entific experts, both academic (5 interviewees) and 
industry (5 interviewees) and have directly or indirectly 
contributed to the development of the neonicotinoid 
regulation. The interviews were conducted between the 
18th of November 2013 and the 4th of February 2014. The 
length of the interviews varies from 39 to 82 minutes. 
                                                          
2 Typical cases refer to cases which are representative within 
the group they are assigned to and different from the group 
they do not belong to (see Rohlfing, 2012). 
3 Attended events: (1) EFSA Scientific Colloquium XIX—
Biodiversity as Protection Goal in Environmental Risk As-
sessment for EU, 7th─28th November 2013, organised by EF-
SA, Parma. (2) Conference for Better Bee Health, 7th April 
2014, organised by the European Commission, Brussels. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Two Interacting Explanatory Factors: High Internal 
Capacity and High Formal and Informal Pressure  
The Commission’s decision to give a mandate to EFSA 
to conduct an independent scientific evaluation on the 
neonicotinoid pesticides has its roots in recent scien-
tific developments and the work of academic scientists 
who prompted the Commission to address the risks of 
neonicotinoids to bees.4 The Commission requested a 
review of this new scientific knowledge regarding the 
role of active neonicotinoid substances, reasoning that 
the neonicotinoid pesticides have already been under 
scrutiny in the academic community - scrutiny which 
resulted in new findings on the issue.5 In recent years, 
scientists’ attention focused on neonicotinoids which, 
in turn, encouraged academic and non-academic ex-
perts from advancing scientific understanding of the ef-
fects of neonicotinoids on bees: “The whole discussion 
picked up speed after the Colony Collapse Disorder 
phenomenon in the US in 2006, there were a lot of sci-
entific projects in the area, basically a lot of laboratory 
studies.”6 Industry, on the contrary, was interested in 
maintaining its product’s place on the market, and 
therefore invested a lot of money in field research to 
provide evidence that the product is safe. Consequent-
ly, there is more expertise, data, knowledge, and un-
derstanding of honeybees and the neonicotinoid pesti-
cides relative to other stressors affecting bee health. 
Pesticides and honeybees have featured heavily in dis-
cussions on the health of bees.7 Experts argue that ex-
isting knowledge in the field is relatively rich and the 
capacity of EFSA to address this issue was high as they 
managed to mobilise internal resources, i.e. the Pesti-
cides Unit.  
However, besides the high capacity of EFSA to pro-
duce scientific outputs on the topic, constant external 
demands can also be empirically observed. To illus-
trate, concerns about neonicotinoids were initially 
raised in France after the launch of imidacloprid and its 
use as a seed treatment of sunflowers.8 Concerns 
among French beekeepers persisted and the French 
regulatory authorities eventually responded in a pre-
cautionary manner by banning the product. Data was 
re-evaluated from time to time, and the ban on neon-
icotinoids was lifted and re-established. The academic 
expert suggested that “to some extent it looks as if 
French authorities have possibly responded to whatever 
pressures from the different stakeholders being passed 
                                                          
4 Academic expert #2, Industry expert #3, #7 
5 New scientific evidence available: e.g., Henry et al. (2012), 
and Whitehorn, O’Connor, Wackers and Goulson (2012). 
6 Industry expert #10 
7 Academic expert #4 
8 Industry expert #3; Academic expert #6 
from whether—the ministry, the government, industry, 
beekeeping or farming communities—differently at dif-
ferent points in time. But the way they switched from al-
lowing to not allowing suggests that there were some 
pressures applied.”9 Eventually, this political debate 
was transferred to the EU level.  
EU institutions, i.e. the European Parliament and 
the European Commission, called for actions regarding 
the neonicotinoid pesticides risk assessment for bees 
at the EU level as the European bee population plays a 
vital role in both pollination and the production of 
honey and other products within the EU: pollinators 
contribute 22 billion Euros each year to European agri-
culture as 84 per cent of crops need insect pollination, 
more than 80 per cent of wild flowers require pollina-
tors to reproduce (European Commission, 2014). For 
this reason, the decline of the bees raises strong con-
cerns in the European Community. The issue has re-
ceived a particular attention from the European institu-
tions. For instance, the European Parliament played a 
significant role in bringing the issue to the EU agenda.10 
The European Commission has laid down specific EU 
rules to protect and maintain the health of bees within 
the EU.  
The EFSA’s scientifically-driven process of under-
standing the risks caused by the pesticides was particu-
larly monitored and strongly criticised or supported by 
a wide variety of institutional and non-institutional ex-
ternal actors.11 The case can be characterised as having 
many external actors actively involved in the process of 
scientific output drafting, including both political and 
non-political actors, e.g. industry, academics, national 
regulatory authorities, and civil society. Scientific ex-
perts invariably refer to high external pressure when 
they discuss the performance of EFSA and the Commis-
sion’s commitment to taking decisive action in this par-
ticular case. According to the interviewees “strong po-
litical NGO pressure (media pressure came later) 
created a very difficult environment for the European 
Commission.”12 Interviewees confirm that the bee is-
sue involves a lot of “political dynamics and there was 
a lot of pressure on the European Parliament by the 
NGOs and individual representatives in the Parlia-
ment.” One interviewee stated, “I have been personal-
ly present when the European Commission presented 
the EFSA results and they clearly admitted in this 
presentation that there was a lot of political pres-
sure.”13 The case can be characterised as politically 
contested as in recent decades the issue of bees’ 
health has gained significant attention within the EU 
and beyond Europe.  
                                                          
9 Academic expert #6 
10 Industry expert #3, Academic expert #1 and #6 
11 All scientific experts 
12 Industry expert #3 
13 Industry expert #8 
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This, in turn, increased the flow of information as 
actors possessing information supporting their position 
were highly interested in providing EFSA with the evi-
dence they possessed. The key actors in the environ-
mental field had strongly contradicting positions and 
scientific evidence supporting these positions. For in-
stance, pesticide manufacturers flooded EFSA with 
field research evidence, while independent academics 
provided EFSA with laboratory research results. NGOs 
and beekeeping associations provided monitoring data, 
arguing that the leading cause of bee population de-
cline was neonicotinoids. As a consequence, the vol-
ume of information coming from outside was exceed-
ingly high and contained diverse and opposing 
conclusions. On one side there were academics causing 
alarm by referring to the laboratory studies, while on 
the other side industry actors invariably referred to 
field research where neonicotinoids were shown to 
have no effect to honeybee mortality: “It was high pro-
file—a lot of interest from the media, a lot of research 
funding for studies looking into the danger posed to 
bees by neonicotinoids, lots of articles published in the 
last two years. Many such articles suggested a prob-
lem, identified a potential hazard, or provided neonico-
tinoids as a possible explanation for why we see a de-
cline in the health of bees. Yet studies carried out 
under field conditions told a different story.”14 
The scientific debate was polarised along political 
lines, i.e. participants’ economic and ideological well-
being was at stake. Opposing coalitions were built to 
promote their own interests and to respond in a united 
fashion. One such coalition was made up of industry 
actors, while the other was the Commission strongly 
pressured by NGOs and beekeeper associations.15 The 
biggest industry companies united by attracting aca-
demics who claimed that the regulatory decision and 
process was highly flawed and patterns of issue politi-
cisation can be observed. “We [industry] have got an 
association that can represent us—the European Crop 
Protection Association. On the European Commission 
side it was easier for them because they are getting a 
consistent message.”16  
Besides differences of opinion among scientific ex-
perts, the issue of bee health has received a large 
amount of public attention. The topic was widely dis-
cussed in the media at national, international and Eu-
ropean levels. “Bees are an emotional topic. With all 
the publicity that you have when you're talking bees, 
especially on the governmental organisation level, the 
pressure is high. It's clear that science is not the only 
basis, but to which parts other factors play into that. 
Most scientists, a great majority of them, are very un-
                                                          
14 Industry expert #7 
15 Industry experts 
16 Industry expert #7 
comfortable how the public debate has developed.”17  
The article proceeds with an empirical analysis of 
how the specified causal configuration—high formal 
and informal pressure and high internal capacity to 
produce scientific outputs—led to the outcome.  
4.2. Strategic Substantiating Use of Expertise? 
This section focuses on the “scientific” elements, i.e. it 
aims to trace how scientific outputs were developed by 
the main scientific expertise body, i.e. the European 
Food Safety Authority, whose influence was defining and 
has led to the major policy change, i.e. the restriction of 
relatively new and most commonly used insecticides.  
4.2.1. A Tale of two Regulatory Approaches: Laboratory 
Research vs. Field Research 
As already discussed, there are contradictions to be 
found when comparing scientific evidence coming from 
laboratory studies and field research. Academic re-
search conducted in laboratory conditions indicates the 
high risks associated with neonicotinoids, while indus-
try-funded research, i.e. field research, concludes that 
under real conditions, neonicotinoids do not put bees 
at an unacceptable risk. Field research is recognised as 
typically more complex, incorporating many different 
facets and tends to be given certain prominence in 
regulatory decision-making due to the inherently more 
realistic exposure scenarios incorporated into it.18 
There is recognition that laboratory research is done in 
a simple environment, e.g. “for honeybees that involve 
individuals isolated in a glass cage, where they are not 
exhibiting normal behaviours or have no opportunity 
to avoid exposure to pesticides.”19 For this reason, la-
boratory studies are presented as the worst-case sce-
nario but regarded as relevant for their repeatability 
and higher statistical power.  
Academic scientists agree that the existing scientific 
knowledge is not in a position to relate the interpreta-
tion from laboratory to field research, and more data is 
needed.20 Academic experts state that, in terms of pub-
lished work, they know that certain doses can lead to 
certain types of effects. However, scientific knowledge 
is limited: scientists do not know if these effects neces-
sarily happen in field situations. They also do not know 
precisely what residues bees are exposed to in land-
scapes with diverse crops. Therefore, pesticides are 
recognised as a highly serious risk, however, there are 
many unanswered questions. Academic experts admit 
that “as a scientific community, we are unfortunately 
not in the position to give people the answers they are 
                                                          
17 Industry expert #10 
18 Academic expert #2, #6 
19 Academic expert #6 
20 Academic expert #6 
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looking for now.”21 Consequently, EFSA had a difficult 
task: to assess the contradicting evidence and to decide 
which evidence was valid and why. If expertise is used by 
EFSA for problem-solving purposes in this particular 
case, one should empirically observe conclusions inde-
pendent from external interests, clear inclusion/ 
exclusion criteria for evidence used in scientific outputs, 
and adherence to other scientific standards (as specified 
in Section 2.2). On the contrary, if scientific expertise is 
used for substantiating purposes, one should empirically 
observe the clear patterns of the one-sided use of scien-
tific evidence that supports the interests of the key ac-
tors in the environmental field (see Section 2.2.). 
As noted above, the Commission has been under a 
lot of pressure from various organised groups to take a 
decision regarding neonicotinoid pesticides.22 Conse-
quently, it issued a request (European Commission, 
2012) to EFSA for a risk assessment of neonicotinoids 
related to their effect on the health of bees in light of 
new scientific knowledge and monitoring data. The 
point to note in the request is that the Commission 
asked EFSA to take into account the forthcoming 
“guidance document”: EFSA scientific opinion on the 
science behind the development of a guidance docu-
ment on the risk assessment of plant protection prod-
ucts on bees. The “guidance document” introduced a 
higher level of scrutiny for interpretation of field stud-
ies (EFSA, 2013d). This new EFSA scientific opinion re-
vised and improved the level of protection regarding 
bees when evaluating risks posed by pesticides.  
The guidance document was introduced in the mid-
dle of the neonicotinoid pesticide risk assessment and 
can be considered to have been a “game changer”. The 
guidance document is seen as controversial by indus-
try, national regulatory agencies and other implement-
ing bodies; that is, it has received over a thousand 
comments from all stakeholders, including industry, 
and was not completely finalised by the time neonico-
tinoids were being evaluated (the document was final-
ised in July 2013 while the neonicotinoid pesticide re-
view was published in January 2013). The majority of 
the data submitted by applicants, i.e. pesticide manu-
facturers, did not meet the new requirements and was 
considered inconclusive and not taken into account 
when drafting scientific conclusions regarding pesti-
cides. “An EFSA review of the science behind the risk 
assessment for pesticides in bees—an opinion—a very 
large European document—changed the whole testing 
and risk assessment paradigm for bees, and then they 
assessed our [industry] existing data against that. Our 
data has been generated under the existing guidelines. 
When they evaluated this data they discounted a large 
proportion of data we had already conducted, and 
then the use of this data was not taken into account in 
                                                          
21 Academic expert #6 
22 Industry and academic experts 
their conclusions.”23 Consequently, when industry-
produced data was held up to the new scientific stand-
ards set out in the guidance document, there were da-
ta gaps identified for many registered uses because 
none of field research that proved safe use were found 
to meet the new scientific standards. Industry claims: 
“The large number of data gaps identified in the EFSA 
review incorrectly gives an impression that industry has 
been negligent and ignored risks” (Campbell, 2013, p. 
53). This suggests that extra efforts were taken by the 
Commission (and followed by EFSA) to justify the inclu-
sion of studies proving a risk and exclude studies sug-
gesting that there was no risk. This is an empirical ob-
servation suggesting that the evidence was used for 
substantiating purposes because without the introduc-
tion of new assessment standards—the new guidance 
document—the EFSA’s scientific conclusions might 
have been different.  
To illustrate, as discussed in the introduction of the 
article, the policy outcomes of EU and US regulatory 
authorities were different, i.e. neonicotinoids were re-
stricted in the EU to prevent a decline in the bee popu-
lation while the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 
the US regulatory authority) has a different approach 
and risk communication strategies. EPA claims to focus 
on the safe use of neonicotinoids, rather than restrict-
ing or banning the product, even though initial con-
cerns about the phenomenon of Colony Collapse Dis-
order were raised in the US (US Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2013). The differences between the 
two approaches are rooted in the debate over which 
evidence can be counted as valid, i.e. laboratory re-
search or field research. EPA decided not to exclude 
any source of evidence and this led to a conclusion al-
lowing the use of pesticides and managing and control-
ling the risks posed by neonicotinoids. EPA explicitly 
notes that they base “pesticide regulatory decisions on 
the entire body of scientific literature, including studies 
submitted by the registrant, journal articles and other 
sources of peer-reviewed data.”24 On the contrary, EF-
SA was implicitly asked to follow a “conservative” ap-
proach by applying a stringent validation criterion to-
wards evidence coming from pesticide manufacturers, 
which led to the exclusion of the majority of industry-
funded research, i.e. field research:25 “EFSA was given a 
narrow mandate and the time available to complete 
the reviews was extremely limited. Consequently, EFSA 
was pushed into taking an extremely critical and highly 
conservative approach in their review, identifying a 
long list of potential data gaps and risks to bees.”26 As a 
result, EFSA’s conclusions exclusively relied on labora-
                                                          
23 Industry expert #7, the same point was mentioned by all 
industry experts 
24 See US Environmental Protection Agency (2013) 
25 See Campbell (2013) 
26 Industry expert #7 
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tory research coming from academic scientists.  
Industry experts believe that the most serious 
weakness of the scientific conclusions of EFSA is that a 
considerable part of the existing evidence from field 
research has been rejected and considered unusable in 
risk assessment.27 They believe that this approach 
“demonstrates a bias in the standard of proof required. 
Evidence of potential harm seems to be easily accept-
ed, whilst evidence of safety is subject to deep scruti-
ny. So even though there is a large body of semi-field 
and field work that shows no impact on long term 
health and survival of honeybee colonies, this is poorly 
accounted for in the risk assessment or entirely ex-
cluded, even where EFSA acknowledge the work to be 
of a high quality.”28 They claim that science is used po-
litically when the reference to theoretical risks is 
made.29 The essence of the concept of the substantiat-
ing expertise use is precisely communicated in the in-
terviews; industry expert stated, “that was not my im-
pression that they fundamentally prefer academic data 
over industry data, but I have noticed a certain focus to 
rather consider data that is substantiating a concern 
rather than data not supporting the concern.”30 Indus-
try claims that the exclusion of field research data was 
a case-by-case decision, and EFSA (by taking into ac-
count the mandate of the Commission) were looking 
for a bigger or smaller perceived shortcoming in each 
study that led to their factual invalidation.  
The interviews of scientific industry experts suggest 
that biased inclusion/exclusion criteria were used to 
evaluate evidence used in the scientific conclusions of 
EFSA. This might cast some doubts, as the pesticides 
industry has an enormous economic interest in keeping 
their products in the market. However, if one follows 
the entire process and triangulate data sources (i.e. re-
lying on official documents) to find additional empirical 
evidence, one observes that the Commission and EFSA 
made extra efforts to introduce the new guidance doc-
ument during the process of neonicotinoid risk evalua-
tion. One could conclude that EFSA’s scientific conclu-
sions were in line with the problem-solving logic, if the 
new guidance document had been finalised before the 
neonicotinoid risk evaluation had started and if indus-
try had had time to provide new data in line with the 
new guidelines. However, the process unfolded in re-
verse as external political and non-political pressures 
to take conclusive action against pesticides remained.  
Given the scientific uncertainty, i.e. controversy, 
between field and laboratory research, “the political 
pressure was to apply the precautionary principle, 
which usually leans towards restriction or a ban. EFSA's 
report says simply “we need more evidence to be con-
                                                          
27 Industry expert #3, #5, #7, #8, #10 and Campbell (2013). 
28 See Campbell (2013) 
29 See note 27 
30 Industry expert #5 
clusive.”31 There has been a considerable amount of 
scientific data drawing into doubt the safety of these 
chemicals in relation to the health of bees and the aca-
demic expert confirmed: “If there is a benefit of doubt, 
it is on the side of bees. If industry in the coming years 
can provide evidence that this is not justified, these 
chemicals can be put on the market again.”32 Scientific 
experts agree that the precautionary principle was ap-
plied in response to high public interest and intense 
campaigning by many organisations—“it was important 
to be doing something.”33 Furthermore, Tonio Borg, a 
Commissioner of the DG for Health and Consumers has 
publicly stated: “it was my personal concern to take a 
decisive action.”34  
To conclude, the principle of precaution as the 
Commission defines it gives more freedom to justify 
stricter regulation in the absence of scientific certainty 
of actual risks. According to Majone (2002) the logic of 
the precautionary principle is likely to produce unde-
sirable consequences as it can be easily misused to 
“justify protectionist measures” and it may promote 
distributive consequences that are against the logic of 
the problem-solving use of expertise. Such a model can 
lead to extrapolation from a toxicological experiment 
with the most sensitive species and maximum doses to 
conclusions referring to high risks in the realistic condi-
tions (Majone, 2002). For instance, in the neonico-
tinoids case, the problem of extrapolation from labora-
tory research to risk in field conditions can be 
observed. This observation hints at broader generalisa-
tion, as the precautionary principle in the EU is used 
beyond food safety issues (e.g. genetically modified or-
ganisms). The principle of precaution is also used to 
ensure a higher level of environmental protection at 
the EU (see Tosun, 2013). 
5. Conclusions 
Recent academic literature has increasingly focused on 
EU agencies’ formal and informal powers, and novel 
and far-reaching functions and influence. The article 
discusses these issues by examining the scientific day-
to-day activities of one EU agency—the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA)—to trace how scientific exper-
tise is used when the agency has to provide a scientific 
conclusion under a particular set of environmental 
conditions, i.e. high formal and informal pressure and 
high internal capacity to produce scientific outputs.  
In the case of neonicotinoid pesticides, the Europe-
an Commission made it explicit that the EFSA’s scien-
tific conclusions and not the Member States’ positions 
                                                          
31 Industry expert #3 
32 Academic expert #1 
33 Academic expert #6 
34 Official speech at the Conference for Better Bee Health, 7th 
April 2014, organised by the European Commission, Brussels. 
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were crucial in the regulation restricting the use of pes-
ticides. This leads us to believe that the need for exper-
tise is one of the factors influencing the shifting author-
ity from classical EU institutions and the unevenly 
distributed preferences of Member States to new non-
state actors, i.e. agencies. However, an in-depth analy-
sis of a single case study conveys a slightly different 
message: particular environmental circumstances call 
for different organisational actions and frame a specific 
context providing expertise organisations with con-
straints to use expertise in a required way and oppor-
tunities to grow in terms of power and influence, pro-
vided that the organisation acts as expected.  
The article concludes that the interaction between 
high external pressure and high internal capacity to re-
spond to this pressure leads to substantiating use of 
expertise, in which scientific evidence is used to pro-
mote the inclinations of those actors on which the 
agency depends most. One cannot observe the prob-
lem-solving logic because the process in which EFSA 
delivered scientific outputs did not follow common 
standards: extra measures were taken to rely on one 
particular source of expertise and scientific conclusions 
were unbalanced and vague. Symbolic practices were 
also absent as EFSA did not imitate what national 
agencies or the US authorities had concluded, on the 
contrary, it conducted a new risk assessment, introduc-
ing a different approach. Finally, EFSA did not engage 
in strategic political activities.  
Multiple sources of evidence suggest that a strate-
gic substantiating expertise use logic was followed. 
Empirical evidence of a single case study suggests that 
the line between risk assessor (EFSA) and risk manager 
(the Commission) is blurred, as the Commission in this 
particular case played an important role in predefining 
the conditions under which specific tasks should be 
carried out. As was illustrated with the comparison be-
tween the US and the EU, the differences between two 
approaches, i.e. EFSA and EPA (US authorities), are 
rooted in the debate as to which evidence counts as 
valid and reliable for drawing regulatory conclusions. 
The article argues that the narrow and stringent man-
date provided a basis for one-sided scientific conclusions 
right from the outset. EFSA was implicitly asked to apply 
a rigid validation criterion towards evidence coming 
from pesticide manufacturers, i.e. field research, which 
led to the exclusion of the majority of industry-funded 
research. This, in turn, led to the more rigorous regula-
tion on the neonicotinoid pesticides that was introduced 
in the logic of the precautionary principle. 
However, this conclusion should not go too far and 
neglect the influence of other actors in the environ-
mental field, such as various NGOs, various associa-
tions, media and strong public feeling regarding the is-
sue. Non-political actors exercising informal pressures 
were active not only during the process of risk assess-
ment, but also before the Commission made its re-
quest to EFSA to assess the risks neonicotinoids posed 
to bees. EFSA was pressured to use substantiating 
strategies to support strong public feeling, values and 
interests in the environmental field. In so doing, EFSA 
was highly successful in maintaining public trust by 
demonstrating its independence of the interests of in-
dustry and by exclusively relying on academic evidence, 
i.e. hypothetically the most reliable and unbiased evi-
dence, which is crucial given the mission of EFSA - to 
gain and maintain public trust in its activities on food 
safety assurance. It seems that empirical evidence from 
the case study supports the theoretical argument: ex-
pertise organisations are likely to survive and grow in 
terms of power and influence if the organisation’s in-
ternal capacity to deal with external pressure matches 
with external demands.  
This study develops starting points for further re-
search. The article has introduced a general theory ex-
plaining the differences in scientific expertise use, 
which have been tested only partly and in one particu-
lar context, i.e. one issue within one EU regulatory 
agency. However, the theoretical argument of the arti-
cle could be said to be relevant to all expertise bodies 
acting on the basis of scientific expertise, including the 
Commission, comitology committees, national agencies, 
international organisations, or other executive, regulato-
ry or information bodies whose expertise feeds into var-
ious policy-making stages. Testing the theoretical expla-
nations outlined in the article in different contexts 
would clearly be a requisite for further research. 
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